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Enabling Genus Patent Claims to DNA 
 
Hugh McTavish* 
 
 
When drafting patent claims, inventors and their attorneys 
attempt to obtain the broadest patent protection possible.  
Samuel Morse, the inventor of the telegraph, claimed not just 
the telegraph, but all means of communicating electronically at 
a distance.1  An inventor of a new chemical discovered to have 
useful properties wants to claim not just that particular 
chemical, but the whole class of chemicals structurally related 
to it, particularly if there is reason to believe that the other 
chemicals in the class will have the same properties.2  A claim 
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 1. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854) (holding that Morse’s claim for 
a patent on all communication made electronically at a distance was invalid 
because it was too broad). 
 2. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  Claim two of 
the patent at issue in Dillon stated that: 
A composition comprising: a hydrocarbon fuel; and a sufficient amount of 
at least one orthoester so as to reduce the particulate emissions from the 
combustion of the hydrocarbon fuel, wherein the orthoester is of the 
formula: 
                                                   O—R7 
                                                  
R8—O—-C———-O—R6 
                                                 
                                                     O—R5 
wherein R5, R6, R7, and R8, are the same or different monovalent organic 
radical comprising 1 to about 20 carbon atoms. 
Id. at 690. 
 This claims a very large class of chemicals.  In fact, it claims almost an 
infinite number of particular chemical structures.  The only restriction on the 
R groups is they contain 1-20 carbon atoms.  They can have the carbon atoms 
arranged in any way (i.e., in a straight chain or a branched chain, with 
branches at different possible locations.  They may or may not contain any 
number of atoms of other elements, such as Cl, N, O, S, Br, H, etc., in any 
possible combination. See  THERALD  MOELLER  ET AL., CHEMISTRY: WITH 
INORGANIC QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS,  CHAPTER 33 (2nd ed. 1984).  
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to a single composition of matter, machine, article of 
manufacture, or process is called a species claim.3  A claim to a 
whole class of the above listed, for instance, one containing 
multiple related species, multiple related chemicals, or multiple 
related processes, is a genus claim or generic claim.4 
In determining whether an inventor is entitled to a genus 
claim or merely a species claim, the courts traditionally first 
determine whether the written specification, which describes 
the invention and how to practice it, enables others to practice 
the invention as broadly as it has been claimed.5  This is the 
enablement requirement, mandated by 35 U.S.C. section 112, 
paragraph 1.6 An additional requirement for patentability, 
 
Furthermore, each R group can be different from each other.  Obviously the 
inventor could not have synthesized every chemical falling within this class.  
However, she presumably synthesized and tested a few, and therefore had 
reason to believe that any chemical containing the core structure shown, four 
ester bonds to a single carbon atom, would have the recited property of 
reducing particulate emissions from the combustion of hydrocarbon fuel. 
 3. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 806.04(e) (2000).  
The manual states that: “[c]laims may be restricted to a single disclosed 
embodiment (i.e., a single species, and thus be designated a specific species 
claim), or a claim may include two or more of the disclosed embodiments 
within the breadth and scope of the definition (and thus be designated a 
generic or genus claim).”  Id.  “Species are always the specifically different 
embodiments.”  Id.  In Dillon, if the claim had been to the orthoester of the 
formula: 
  O—R7 
    
R8—O———C———O—R6 
 
  O—R5 
it would have been a species claim since just one chemical is being claimed. 
 4. See, e.g., Dillon 919 F.2d at 690 (explaining that the claim at issue 
was a genus claim because it encompasses a whole class of species; in this case 
a class of chemicals united by a structural feature); O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112 
(illustrating that Samuel Morse’s claim to all means of communicating 
electronically at a distance, is a genus claim because it encompasses many 
means); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 806.04(d) (“[A] generic 
claim should include no material element additional to those recited in the 
species claims, and must comprehend within its confines the organization 
covered in each of the species.”).  See also supra note 3 (presenting the 
chemical structure of one of the species the claim in Dillon encompasses). 
 5. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (C.C.P.A. 
1976) (explaining that if those seeking patents have sufficiently enabled 
others skilled in the applicable art, then the claim is valid). 
 6. The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, 
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found in 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 1, is the written 
description requirement.7  In several recent recombinant DNA 
cases, the Federal Circuit interpreted the written description 
requirement in a way that led it to strike down generic claims, 
notwithstanding that they were enabled.8  The Federal Circuit 
has held that claimed DNA must be described by specification 
of its nucleotide sequence,9 and that compositions of matter 
(specifically DNA) can never be described by its function or 
method of isolation, but must be described by its structure.10  
Interestingly enough, the second holding, though phrased 
generally, has not been applied to a similar major area of 
biotechnology patent subject matter—monoclonal antibodies.11  
These additional requirements make generic claims to 
recombinant DNA inventions difficult, if not impossible. 
This Note will argue that these additional requirements for 
recombinant DNA patents should be eliminated and that the 
Federal Circuit should instead return to a focus on the 
enablement requirement.  The Note will then describe the 
enablement and written description requirements and how 
these statutory requirements apply to biotechnology cases.  
Finally, this Note will argue that the court’s current approach 
is flawed and propose that the court’s evaluation of DNA 
patents should return to an emphasis on the enablement 
requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000). 
 7. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-64 (Fed. Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981). 
 8. See Regents of Univ. Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-71 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993); and 
Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1200-13 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 9. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1567. 
 10. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169 (“[I]rrespective of the complexity or 
simplicity of the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like 
conception of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance 
other than by its functional utility.”). 
 11. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); infra notes 75-79 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Wands case). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT 
 
To receive a patent, an inventor must describe the 
invention well enough for one skilled in the art to understand, 
make, and use it.12  That requirement is codified in 35 U.S.C. 
section 112, paragraph 1: 
The specification [of a patent] shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled 
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.13 
The patent specification must be sufficiently detailed to 
enable others skilled in the art to practice the claimed 
invention without “undue experimentation.”14  The specification 
need not be so detailed as to enable a layperson to practice the 
invention.15  Rather, it must enable a person skilled in the art, 
which in biotechnology is a Ph.D.-level scientist, who also is 
knowledgeable in the subdiscipline of the invention and skilled 
in that subdiscipline’s routine techniques.16 
The other key aspect of the enablement requirement is that 
it only requires that others will not have to perform “undue 
experimentation” to reproduce it.  Enablement is not precluded 
by the necessity of some experimentation,  “[t]he key word is 
‘undue,’ not experimentation.”17  The court in In Re Wands 
stated a test for what would constitute “undue 
experimentation”: “The test [for undue experimentation] is not 
merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of 
experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine or if the 
specification in question provides a reasonable amount of 
 
 12. “To be enabling under § 112, a patent must contain a description that 
enables one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention.” Atlas 
Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000). 
 14. See In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1976); PPG Industries, 
Inc. v. Guardian Industries, Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that to satisfy the enabling requirement, a patent must show those 
skilled in the art how to make and use the invention). 
 15. See Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1372-74 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 16. See id. 
 17. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504. 
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guidance with respect to the direction in which the 
experimentation should proceed . . . .”18 
Enablement is generally considered to be the most 
important factor for determining the scope of claim protection 
allowed.19  The scope of enablement must be commensurate 
with the scope of the claims.20  However, enablement does not 
require that an inventor disclose every possible embodiment of 
his invention.21  Additionally, there is a policy to reward pioneer 
inventions with broad protection. 22  Since a pioneer inventor 
may have enabled a broad new range of inventions, courts 
consider that the inventor should be rewarded for it.23 
 
 18. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988), (quoting In re 
Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (BNA)). 
 19. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 660 (2nd ed. 1997). 
 20. See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1212; O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 62.  In O’Reilly, 
the inventor, Samuel Morse, had claimed “the use of . . . electromagnetism, 
however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters . . . at any 
distance . . .”  Id. at 112.  Morse had not taught how to practice or even 
imagined all possible means of communicating at a distance via 
electromagnetism. See id. at 112-14.  He had only enabled one means—the 
telegraph—others later invented other means.  See id. at 68-74.  See also In re 
Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a means plus 
function claim, claiming all means for achieving a given function, was invalid 
for lack of enablement where only a single means was disclosed). 
 21. See Clark Blade & Razor Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 194 F. 421, 
423 (3rd Cir. 1912), (quoting Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 
286, 302 (1894)).  The court stated that: 
[F]or if such were the law, patentability must have been denied to 
Elias Howe for the “grooved and eye-pointed needle,” . . . of which it 
was said [by the Supreme Court] in Deering v. Winona, 155 U.S. 
286, 15 Sup. Ct. 118, 39 L.Ed. 153: ‘The invention of a needle with 
the eye near the point is the basis of all the sewing machines used, 
but the methods of operating such a needle are many; and if Howe 
had been obliged to make his own method a part of every claim in 
which the needle was an element, his patent would have been 
practically worthless. 
Id. at 423. 
 22. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).  The Hogan court 
expressed this policy stating that: 
To restrict [a patentee] to the . . . form disclosed . . . would be a poor 
way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its early 
disclosure.  To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy 
against broad protection for pioneer inventions, a policy both 
shortsighted and unsound from the standpoint of promoting 
progress in the useful arts, the constitutional purpose of the patent 
laws. 
Id. at 606. 
 23. See id. 
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The enablement requirement is stricter for “unpredictable 
arts” than predictable ones.  Thus, “[i]f an invention pertains to 
an art where the results are predictable, . . . a broad claim can 
be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment.”24  Courts 
consider, for instance, that the field of electronics is a 
predictable art.25  From the invention of a single type of circuit, 
courts presume that one skilled in the art may be able to create 
other, similar circuits and know with a reasonable certainty 
that they will perform predictably.26  In contrast, chemistry and 
biology are often classified as unpredictable arts.27  Courts are 
hesitant to allow a claim encompassing a broad class of 
chemicals from the synthesis of one or a few chemicals of the 
class:28 though one can make reasonable predictions about the 
characteristics of similar chemicals, one is not entirely certain 
until the new species are actually synthesized and 
characterized.29  In unpredictable arts, enablement of generic 
claims is considered lacking because the undescribed 
embodiments cannot be made without undue 
experimentation.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 24. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 
1987) (citing In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (CCPA 1971); In re Vickers, 141 
F.2d 522, 527 (CCPA 1944)). 
 25. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“In cases 
involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, a 
single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense that, once 
imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their 
performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws.”). 
 26. See id.  Because of the complexity of circuits in many modern 
semiconductor chips, that presumption is no longer valid.  Developers often do 
not know how a circuit will perform until it is tested.  See Christine Gorman, 
Hacking the Cell’s Circuitry, TIME, Aug. 7, 2000, at 75. 
 27. See e.g., Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839.  See also In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 
734 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (deciding that in lieu of labeling an entire art predictable 
or unpredictable; a case by case inquiry determining whether the factors 
involved in the art are predictable or not is more proper). 
 28. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223-24 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re 
Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 29. See Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223-24; Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1383. 
 30. See Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1383 (“In . . . chemical cases, where there is 
unpredictability in performance of certain species or subcombinations other 
than those specifically enumerated, one skilled in the art may be found not to 
have been placed in possession of a genus . . . .”). 
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B. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
 
In biotechnology cases, the Federal Circuit has given 
prominence to another requirement for patentability that in 
other fields has rarely been invoked to invalidate patent claims: 
the written description requirement.  The written description 
requirement, like the enablement requirement, is derived from 
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.31  It is a requirement that the 
patent application provide “adequate support” for the claims at 
issue.32  The standard is that an applicant must convey with 
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the 
filing date, the applicant was in possession of the invention.33  
The requirement most often arises in disputes over whether 
claims can relate back to the specification of an earlier 
application to gain the benefit of that earlier filing date.34 
The purpose of the written description requirement is to 
guard “against the inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he 
recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can 
be determined to be encompassed within his original 
 
 31. See Vas-Cath, Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560-64. 
 32. See id. at 1560. 
 33. See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 34. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and 132 (2000).  Section 120 provides: “An 
application for a patent for an invention disclosed in an application previously 
filed . . ., which is filed by an inventor or inventors named  in the previously 
filed application, shall have the same effect as to such invention as though 
filed on the date of the prior application . . . .”  Section 132 addresses the 
limitations on the amendment of a patent after it has been rejected.  It 
provides that “[n]o amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure 
of the invention.”  Thus, under § 132, if an inventor wishes to introduce new 
claims during the consideration of her patent or the specification of the patent, 
the written description of the invention, must provide “adequate support” for 
the new claims.  See Vas-Cath, Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560.  Otherwise, she must 
file a new patent, with a later filing date, wherein the invention might no 
longer be patentable because of prior art arising between the two filing dates.  
Likewise, under § 120, an inventor can file a new patent, but relate it back to 
the filing date of an earlier application (again so as to antedate certain prior 
art that arose in the meantime) if the earlier application’s written description 
of its invention provides support for the claims of the new patent.  See id. 
 In Vas-Cath, the inventor filed a utility patent for a catheter claiming a 
lumen that is “substantially greater than one-half but substantially less than 
a full diameter.”  See id. at 1566.  An earlier design application by the same 
inventors for the same or similar catheter had included drawings of the 
catheter, but the earlier application had said nothing about the range of 
diameter for the lumen.  See id.  The defendants argued, and the court agreed, 
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to derive the claimed 
range from the earlier drawing, and so the earlier application had provided an 
adequate written description to support the new claims.  See id. 
128 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:121 
 
creation.”35  This formulation suggests that the written 
description requirement is only relevant to determine whether 
claims can relate back to an earlier specification.  Another 
expression of the purpose is that the requirement prevents 
inventors from practicing “upon the credulity or the fears of 
other persons, by pretending that his invention is more than 
what it really is.”36  This implies that courts are concerned 
about deception and want proof that the inventor actually 
invented what he has claimed. 
 
C. BIOTECHNOLOGY CASES 
 
1. Written Description Requirement 
 
The Federal Circuit has used the written description 
requirement to strike down the claims in a key biotechnology 
case.  In Regents of Univ. Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,37 the 
University of California (“UC”) had cloned and determined the 
nucleotide sequence of the rat insulin cDNA.38  From that 
 
 35. See Vas-Cath Inc., 935 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Rengo Co., Ltd. v. Molins 
Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3rd Cir.)). 
 36. See id. (quoting Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 434 (1822)). 
 37. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 38. DNA is composed of four nucleotides: A, C, G, and T.  The structure of 
a DNA can be defined by the sequence of these nucleotides, e.g., 
AAGTCCAGT.  The term cDNA can be thought of as synonymous with gene for 
our purposes.  It is a stretch of DNA created by recombinant DNA techniques 
that codes for one, or sometimes a few, proteins.  DNA is double stranded, 
with the nucleotides of one strand binding to the complementary nucleotides of 
the other strand.  A is complementary to T, and C is complementary to G.  The 
two strands of a gene are called the template strand and the non-template 
strand.  Thus, the sequence of the two strands of a portion of a gene would 
look like this: 
 
non-template      ACGTTCCAA 
template             TGCAAGGTT 
 
 When the gene is expressed, the template strand is “read,” or used as a 
template for the synthesis of a complementary strand of RNA.  That process is 
called transcription.  The resultant RNA has the same sequence as the non-
template strand, except that RNA uses nucleotides called uridine, or U, 
instead of the thymidine, or T, of DNA.  The RNA strand is called messenger 
RNA, or mRNA.  Thus, the template DNA and mRNA would have these 
sequences: 
 
mRNA              ACGUUCCAA 
DNA template   TGCAAGGTT 
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discovery, UC claimed generic patents for cDNA encoding any 
vertebrate insulin and cDNA encoding any mammalian 
insulin.39  The court ruled those broad claims invalid for lack of 
an adequate written description.40  It reasoned that a 
description of rat insulin cDNA is not a description of 
vertebrate or mammalian cDNA.41  Likewise, the court 
reasoned that the mere name “mammalian insulin cDNA” is 
not an adequate description because it describes the function of 
the gene, but not the structure.42  It is a description of what the 
gene does, which is encode insulin, not of what it is made.43  An 
adequate description “requires a kind of specificity usually 
achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of 
nucleotides that make up the cDNA.”44 
To enable generic claims, applicants “are not required to 
disclose every species encompassed by their claims, even in an 
unpredictable art.”45  However, disclosure of one species’ gene 
sequence, such as rat insulin cDNA, was held not enough to 
claim the gene sequence for the entire genus of mammalian 
 
 
 The mRNA dissociates from the DNA to become a single-stranded mRNA, 
and the template DNA strand reassociates with the non-template DNA to 
reform double-stranded DNA.  Next the mRNA is “translated” by cellular 
enzymes into a protein.  That is, the sequence of nucleotides in the RNA will 
determine the sequence of amino acids in the protein whose synthesis it 
directs.  One mRNA codes for the synthesis of one or a few proteins.  A gene is 
defined as a sequence of DNA that codes for one protein.  So sometimes an 
mRNA corresponds to one gene, sometimes to a few genes.  See WILLIAM B. 
WOOD, BIOCHEMISTRY: A PROBLEMS APPROACH, CHAPTERS 17, 18, 20 (2nd ed. 
1981). 
 The DNA at issue in Eli Lilly was a complementary DNA, or cDNA.  A 
cDNA is synthesized from a mRNA.  Enzymes are used that will copy a single-
stranded mRNA into a double-stranded DNA, and the double-stranded DNA 
that results is called a cDNA.  The cDNA will have the same sequence as the 
genomic DNA (genomic DNA is the DNA naturally present in the cell) that 
was originally used in the cell to direct transcription of the mRNA, with one 
difference.  Genomic DNA contains sequences of varying sorts that do not 
encode proteins and are not transcribed into RNA.  In fact, in mammals, 
including humans, the overwhelming majority of DNA is not transcribed into 
RNA.  Thus, a cDNA corresponds to only the DNA that is transcribed into 
RNA, most of which encodes the amino acid sequences of proteins.  See JAMES 
DARNELL ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 249-55 (1986). 
 39. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1562-63. 
 40. See id. at 1566-69. 
 41. See id. at 1568. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 1569. 
 45. Id. (quoting In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502-03 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
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insulin cDNAs.46  The court suggested that enumeration of 
cDNAs for a plurality of species may provide an implicit 
description of the genus.47 
In Eli Lilly, UC also claimed human insulin cDNA, 
supported in the patent specification by a protocol for isolating 
the human cDNA, which was based on the procedure used for 
isolating rat insulin cDNA and the known amino acid sequence 
of human insulin.48  The court said that “whether or not [this] 
provides an enabling disclosure, it does not provide a written 
description of the cDNA encoding human insulin.”49  
Apparently the nucleotide sequence would be required in order 
to provide an adequate written description of the claim.50 
Such strict written description requirements indicate that 
the enablement requirement is inadequate in recombinant 
DNA inventions.  Taken literally, it means that no matter how 
routine it may become to clone and sequence DNA, and no 
matter how complete the enablement of a recombinant DNA 
invention, the DNA cannot be claimed without a specification of 
its nucleotide sequence. 
 The Federal Circuit took the same position in one of the 
cases cited in Eli Lilly.  Fiers v. Revel51 involved a priority 
dispute over a recombinant DNA invention.  In Fiers, the court 
denied priority to the party that first conceived of the 
successful procedure for isolating the gene, even though it 
found that the procedure was routine to one skilled in the art.52  
Instead, it awarded priority to the party that first determined 
the gene’s nucleotide sequence.53  The court stated that 
“[i]rrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the method of 
isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any 
chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance 
other than by its functional utility.”54  The court went on to hold 
that conception of a process for making a substance, i.e. for 
cloning a gene, does not constitute conception of the gene 
 
 46. See id. at 1567-69. 
 47. See id. at 1569. 
 48. See id. at 1567. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 52. See id. at 1167-69. 
 53. See id. at 1172. 
 54. See id. at 1169. 
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itself.55  Conception for a substance claim, i.e. to the gene itself, 
requires conception of the nucleotide sequence of a gene, which 
is the substance’s physical structure.56 
 
2. Breadth of Enablement in Recombinant DNA Cases 
 
Two Federal Circuit cases directly addressed the scope of 
enablement provided in recombinant DNA inventions.  In each 
case, the court concluded that the breadth of enablement 
provided by the specification was too narrow for the generic 
claims at issue.  In Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,57 
Amgen had cloned the gene for human erythropoietin (“EPO”), 
a hormone that stimulates red blood cell production.58  Claim 7 
of the patent claimed all DNA sequences “encoding a 
polypeptide having an amino acid sequence sufficiently 
duplicative of . . . EPO to allow possession of the biological 
property of causing bone marrow cells to increase production of 
 . . . red blood cells . . . .”59  The court ruled the claim invalid for 
lack of an enabling disclosure, based on the fact that the patent 
specification taught only how to prepare a few analogs of the 
EPO gene, whereas it claimed any DNA encoding a protein 
with EPO biological activity and an amino acid sequence 
similar to EPO.60  The court ruled that the scope of enablement 
was not as broad as the scope of the claims.61 
 
 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id.  The court cites Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 
1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), for this view.  However, this is actually a departure 
from Amgen.  In Amgen, the court focused on the uncertain success of the 
conceived method for isolating the gene as the reason it ruled that conception 
of the gene did not occur until it was actually isolated.  See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 
1207.  For “conception of a purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding 
human EPO, . . . Fritsch’s conception of a process had to be sufficiently specific 
that one skilled in the relevant art would succeed in cloning the EPO gene.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  That certainly implies that if success were guaranteed, 
conception of a process for obtaining the gene would constitute conception of 
the gene. 
 57. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 58. See id. at 1212. 
 59. Id. at 1204. 
 60. See id. at 1213.  The court stated that the “[d]etails for preparing only 
a few EPO analog genes are disclosed.  This ‘disclosure’ might justify a generic 
claim encompassing these and similar analogs, but it represents inadequate 
support for Amgen’s desire to claim all EPO-type products.”  Id. 
 61. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213-14. 
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The court asserted that it is theoretically possible for a 
genus claim to genetic sequences to be valid.62  One has to 
wonder about that assertion, since the Federal Circuit has 
never upheld a genus claim to DNA sequences. 
The second case that directly addresses scope of 
enablement in recombinant DNA patents is Enzo Biochem, Inc. 
v. Calgene, Inc.,63 a case dealing with a patent on antisense 
technology.  Antisense technology is a means of controlling 
gene expression by reducing the production of particular 
proteins inside a cell.64  In this case, Calgene used the 
technology in its flavr savr tomato to slow the ripening process 
in tomatoes.65  They used antisense to reduce the production of 
an enzyme that promotes ripening.66 
 
 
 62. See id. at 1214.  The court reasoned that: 
 [We] do not intend to imply that generic claims to genetic sequences 
cannot be valid where they are of a scope appropriate to the invention 
disclosed by an applicant.  That is not the case here, where Amgen has 
claimed every possible analog of a gene containing about 4,000 
nucleotides with a disclosure only of how to make EPO and a few 
analogs. 
Id. 
 In addition the court stated that: 
[I]t is not necessary that a patent applicant test all the embodiments of 
his invention. [W]hat is necessary is that he provide a disclosure 
sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the invention 
commensurate with the scope of his claims.  For DNA sequences, that 
means disclosing how to make and use enough sequences to justify grant 
of the claims sought.  Amgen has not done that here. 
 Id. at 1213. 
 63. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 64. See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1362.  The idea of antisense 
technology is rather simple.  In gene expression, an enzyme called RNA 
polymerase copies one strand of the segment of DNA making up a gene or 
group of genes, the template strand, into a complementary RNA strand.  This 
single stranded RNA, called a messenger RNA (mRNA) is “translated” into 
protein.  Enzymes in the cell “read” the single-stranded mRNA and translate 
it into protein. 
 In antisense technology, a DNA construct is created so that the 
nontemplate strand of some gene, rather than the template strand, is 
transcribed into RNA.  This single-stranded antisense RNA binds to the 
complementary mRNA for that gene that exists naturally in the cell.  This 
makes the RNA double stranded instead of single stranded, so that it cannot 
be read by the cellular enzymes and translated into protein.  Thus, in theory 
at least, that particular protein is not created as the long as the antisense 
RNA is present.  See id. at 1366-67. 
 65. See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1368. 
 66. See id. 
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Enzo had a patent that claimed antisense technology in all 
organisms including bacteria, plants, animals, fungi, and 
viruses.67  The inventor only succeeded in regulating three 
genes in one organism; the E. coli bacterium.68  He failed in 
attempts to regulate some other genes in E. coli.69 There were 
no examples of success in any other organisms.70  Despite these 
failures, the claims were drawn very broadly. 
In evaluating whether the disclosure enabled the generic 
claims, the court considered the list of factors set forth in In re 
Wands: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of 
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working 
examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, 
(6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or 
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.71 
The issue for the court was whether these broad generic 
claims were enabled by the disclosure.  The court found that: 
the claims were extraordinarily broad, covering an infinite 
number of cell types;72 antisense technology was highly 
unpredictable;73 the quantity of experimentation necessary to 
adapt the technology to plants or to any species other than E. 
coli was quite high;74 and that the amount of direction and 
number of examples provided in the specification were very 
narrow compared to the breadth of the claims.75 
The court invalidated the claims, holding that the breadth 
of enablement was not commensurate with the breadth of the 
claims.76  It did, however, leave the door open for generic claims 
in biotechnology, stating: 
It is well settled that patent applicants are not required to 
disclose every species encompassed by their claims, even in an 
unpredictable art.  However, there must be sufficient 
disclosure, either through illustrative examples or terminology, 
to teach those of ordinary skill how to make and use the 
 
 67. See id. at 1367-68. 
 68. See id. at 1372-73. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 1371 (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 72. See id. at 1372. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. at 1372-73. 
 75. See id. at 1374-75. 
 76. See id. at 1372-75. 
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invention as broadly as it is claimed.77 
The court also said that with advances in science, what 
was unpredictable at one time may become predictable and, at 
that time, broader generic claims are more likely to be 
allowed.78 
A third recombinant DNA case, In re Bell,79 was decided 
based on whether the prior art made the claimed invention 
obvious.  The court’s analysis also sheds some light on the 
enablement requirement.  An obviousness inquiry has two 
parts: first, whether the prior art suggests the claimed 
invention, and second, whether the prior art demonstrates a 
reasonable expectation of success in attempting to practice the 
claimed invention.80  The second part of the inquiry asks 
whether the prior art enables one skilled in the art to practice 
the invention.  In Bell, the inventors claimed the genes for 
human insulin-like growth factors I and II.81  The complete 
amino acid sequences of both proteins were already known 
from the prior art.82  The question for the court was whether 
this and the prior art in recombinant DNA cloning made the 
genes obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.83  The court 
first considered whether the method used to select the clone, 
hybridization with degenerate oligonucleotide primers, would 
have been obvious to one skilled in the art.84  The court found it 
would not—a finding that is clearly in error.  The method of 
using degenerate oligonucleotide primers to select DNA clones 
was in the prior art.  That method was, at the time, and, still is 
today, the preferred method to select a gene based on 
knowledge of the full or partial amino acid sequence of the 
protein it encodes85 and would have been the obvious method to 
try. 
 
 
 77. Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 & n.23 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)). 
 78. See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1374 n.10. 
 79. 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 80. See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Anita 
Varma and David Abraham, DNA is Different: Legal Obviousness and the 
Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 81 
(1996).  See also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2142 (2000). 
 81. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 82. See id. at 783. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. at 784-85. 
 85. See Varma and Abraham, supra note 80, at 61-62 and 82. 
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Whether the method, at that time, would have had a 
reasonable expectation of success is a closer question, which the 
court did not reach.  Today, success would be nearly assured 
without undue experimentation.86  At the time of Bell, in 1981, 
the method was new, and perhaps, a person of ordinary skill in 
the art would not have felt so certain that it would succeed.87  If 
we assume, though, that there was a reasonable expectation of 
success in cloning the gene, then from an enablement 
standpoint, the prior art made the invention of the cloned gene 
obvious.  We could say that the prior art enabled one of 
ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention. 
The court did not find the genes obvious for the following 
reasons.  First, because it wrongly concluded that the method 
to isolate the genes was not obvious.88  Second, regardless of the 
obviousness of the method, “the issue is the obviousness of the 
compositions, not of the method by which they are made.”89  
Because of the degeneracy of the genetic code, the court 
asserted that 1036 nucleotide sequences could encode the known 
amino acid sequence, and thus, the structure of the gene was 
not obvious.90  If the focus instead had been on the obviousness 
of the method used to isolate the gene, along with a reasonable 
expectation of success (in other words, whether or not the prior 
art enabled the practice of the invention) the genes should have 
been ruled obvious. 
The Federal Circuit declined to consider, in Eli Lilly,91 
whether the claims at issue were enabled, but it is useful for 
the purposes of this note to determine whether they were.  The 
University of California researchers had discovered and cloned 
the nucleotide sequence of the rat insulin cDNA.92  From this, 
they generically claimed vertebrate and, more narrowly, 
mammalian insulin cDNAs, as well as specifically human 
 
 86. Even the author was able to use the procedure to clone a gene.  See H. 
McTavish et al., Sequence of the Gene Coding for Ammonia Monooxygenase 
from Nitrosomonas europaea, 175  J. BACTERIOL. 2436 (1993). 
 87. See Varma and Abraham, supra note 80, at 61-62 (arguing that the 
procedures made reasonably certain, even at the time the experiments were 
initiated in Bell). 
 88. See Bell, 991 F.2d at 784. 
 89. Id. at 785. 
 90. See id. at 784. 
 91. Regents of Univ. Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 92. See id. at 1562-63. 
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insulin cDNA, which they had not yet cloned.93  Their 
specification described methods to isolate these cDNAs by 
reference to the method used to isolate the rat insulin cDNA.94  
First, one would make a cDNA library from the appropriate 
tissue of the organism—the islet cells of the pancreas.95  Then 
one would screen the library with the rat insulin cDNA.96  The 
creation of cDNA libraries was fairly new but becoming routine 
in the art by the time of the UC application in 1977.97  
Screening that library with the cloned cDNA from a 
homologous gene was also routine and would be virtually 
certain to succeed.98  Proteins performing the same function in 
any two species of mammals are certain to have very similar 
amino acid sequences.99  Likewise, the genes for those proteins 
are certain to be homologous.  It follows that there was at least 
a reasonable expectation that the screening of mammallian 
cDNA libraries with rat insulin cDNA would succeed in 
isolating the insulin cDNA from any desired mammallian 
species, including humans.  Even though UC only knew the 
sequence of rat insulin cDNA, its specification of that invention 
enabled anyone skilled in the art to isolate any other 
mammallian insulin cDNA.  The procedure, while lengthy and 
time consuming, all but assured success.100  Thus, the 
 
 93. See id. 
 94. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,652,525, W.J. Rutter et al., Recombinant Bacterial 
Plasmids Containing the Coding Sequences of Insulin Genes. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id.  See also U.S. Pat. No. 4,431,740, G. Bell et al., DNA Transfer 
Vector and Transformed Microorganism Containing Human Proinsulin and 
Pre-Proinsulin Genes. 
 97. See T. Maniatis et al., Amplification and Characterization of a -Globin 
Gene Synthesized in Vitro, 8 CELL 163 (1976). 
 98. See W. David Benton & Ronald W. Davis, Screening gt Recombinant 
Clones by Hybridization to Single Plaques in situ, 196 SCIENCE 180-81 (1977) 
(describing both the process and accuracy of the screening methods.) 
 99. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CREIGHTON, PROTIENS: STRUCTURES AND 
MOLECULAR PROPERTIES, Ch. 3 (2nd ed. 1993).  The same protein in closely 
related species, such as insulin in rats and humans, usually differs by 
relatively few amino acids.  For instance, the human hemoglobin -chain differs 
in amino acid sequence from the analogous protein in Rhesus monkey by 3% 
and from cow by 12%.  Additionally, these differences in amino acid sequence 
occur in regions of the protein that do not play an essential role in its function. 
 100. After obtaining a rat cDNA, the UC researchers required two years to 
clone the human cDNA.  See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1562-63.  Today this 
task would not take as long. 
 The obvious counterargument would suggest that the disclosure was not 
enabling of the human cDNA because cloning the human gene would require 
undue experimentation.  A finding of undue experimentation could be 
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specification enabled the generic claims. 
However, the court never reached that question, disposing 
of the case instead on its rule that a written description of a 
claimed gene must include its specific nucleotide sequence. 
Thus, these generic claims were disallowed.  The focus on both 
the written description requirement and structure meant that 
otherwise enabled claims were invalid. 
 
3. Enablement in a Monoclonal Antibody Case 
 
The Federal Circuit’s holdings regarding another major 
area of biotechnology have differed from its holdings regarding 
recombinant DNA patents.  The court has allowed monoclonal 
antibodies,101 unlike genes or DNA molecules, to be described by 
their function and conceived by their method of isolation 
without structural description.  In In re Wands,102 the 
 
supported by the length and recent development of the procedure.  At the time 
the UC patent at issue in Eli Lilly was filed, the procedures used to clone both 
the rat and human insulin genes were relatively new and researchers did not 
have a great deal of experience with the techniques.  See id.  On that basis, 
perhaps one could argue that someone who attempted to clone the human 
insulin gene using the patent disclosing the rat gene would not have been 
certain of success.  The certainty of success had not yet been established.  
Nonetheless, we know that the method disclosed in the patent would have led 
to successfully cloning the human gene.  UC, in fact, did enable the cloning of 
the human gene.  Furthermore, the methods of creating a cDNA library and 
screening it for a particular clone have not changed a great deal since the UC 
patent application.  Compare Maniatis, supra note 97, at 163 (“develop[ing] a 
method for gene purification and amplification which could be applied to 
any . . . gene whose mRNA could be obtained.”), with T. MANIATIS, E.F. 
FRITSCH, AND J. SAMBROOK, MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL 
(1982), and T. MANIATIS, E.F. FRITSCH, AND J. SAMBROOK, MOLECULAR 
CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL (2nd ed. 1989) (describing essentially the 
same cloning techniques, respectively, six and thirteen years later). 
 101. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733-34 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (providing an 
insightful general description of monoclonal antibodies).  Antibodies are a 
class of proteins that help defend the body against invaders.  Antibodies bind 
tightly to other molecules, present on the invaders, called antigens.  The 
tightness of the antibody-antigen binding is called affinity.  Each antibody 
binds to just one antigen, and in fact to just one part of the antigen molecule, 
called a determinant.  In an immune response, many different antibodies — 
that is, proteins with different amino acid sequences — binding to the same 
antigen are produced.  Different antibodies binding to the same determinant 
on the antigen are even produced. From this diversity of antibodies binding to 
a single antigen, scientists can select one of these antibodies and make large 
amounts of it.  These identical antibodies produced from a single cell type are 
called monoclonal antibodies.  See also BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, 181-84, 951-1012 (1983). 
 102. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 734. 
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appellants claimed an immunoassay method for detecting 
hepatitis-B surface antigen using any IgM monoclonal antibody 
with a binding affinity constant of greater than 109 
moles/liter.103  The issue before the court was whether the 
disclosure enabled this broad claim.104  The inventors disclosed 
a method for isolating IgM monoclonal antibodies meeting 
those binding affinity specifications.105  This disclosure of a 
procedure to isolate a monoclonal antibody sufficiently satisfied 
the enablement requirement, because it was routinely used by 
those skilled in the art and, more importantly, it had a high 
rate of success in producing monoclonal antibodies fitting the 
claims.106  Thus, the disclosure did not require undue 
experimentation.107  This ruling came despite the fact that the 
method was lengthy and was difficult enough that even the 
inventors had trouble in their first few attempts.108 
Interestingly, each time a scientist isolated monoclonal 
antibodies to produce this invention, he would isolate a 
different monoclonal antibody.109  Although the antibody 
isolated would have the same functional characteristic — 
binding hepatitis B surface antigen with high affinity — it 
would have a different amino acid sequence.110  By the logic of 
Eli Lilly and Fiers, each isolation would be a different 
invention. 
The court here, unlike in the DNA cases, focused on 
enablement, not structure.111  It did not address the issue, 
perhaps because it was not raised, of whether the amino acid 
sequence of the monoclonal antibody used was not specified.  
Nor was the court bothered (again perhaps because the 
argument was not raised) by the fact that anyone attempting to 
practice this invention would isolate a monoclonal antibody 
with a different amino acid sequence. 
 
 
 103. See id. at 734-35.  Antibodies can be used for sensitive diagnostic tests 
called immunoassays that detect the presence of the antigen to which an 
antibody binds, such as hepatitis-B surface antigen. 
 104. See id. at 735. 
 105. See id. at 736. 
 106. See id. at 739-40. 
 107. See id. at 740. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See T.D. BROCK & M.T. MADIGAN, BIOLOGY OF MICROORGANISMS 437-
46 (6th ed. 1991). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 735-40. 
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D. AN ECONOMIC ARGUMENT AGAINST GENUS PATENTS 
 
The Federal Circuit seems to have erected special barriers 
to generic or broad claims in biotechnology, particularly in 
recombinant DNA.  Presumably, the court is concerned with 
allowing broad areas of a new field of technology to be blocked 
from competition.  An economic basis for those concerns was 
articulated by Robert Merges and Richard Nelson.112 
A broad patent can give the patent holder rights not just 
over the invention, but also over some improvements on the 
invention when those improvements are considered obvious.113  
Merges and Nelson argue that this is economically inefficient.114  
When a single rightholder controls the rights to future 
improvements on a current technology, it can be expected that 
the rightholder will underdevelop the improvements.115  The 
single entity will have less imagination and take a less wide-
ranging approach to exploring possible improvements than 
would multiple actors.116  Second, when a firm has rights to the 
improvements, it will move more slowly in developing the 
improvements, because it need not fear that others will develop 
them first and obtain a monopoly over the improvements.117  
The ultimate concern here is not the firm, but rather, the 
possible lack of incentive to improve technology in the field. 
 
E. BLOCKING PATENTS 
 
When broad patent claims are awarded, as this note 
advocates, it intrinsically increases the possibility of 
nonobvious improvements falling within the scope of the 
claims.  Blocking patents arise when an inventor claims a 
nonobvious patentable improvement that literally infringes an 
earlier patent.118  An example of how this can arise is when a 
 
 112. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (arguing that the breadth of a 
patent influences its economic significance). 
 113. See id. at 845-49. 
 114. See id. at 844.  In many industries the efficiency gains from the 
pioneer’s ability to coordinate are likely to be outweighed by the loss of 
competition for improvements to the basic invention.  See id. 
 115. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 112, at 873-74. 
 116. See id. at 873-75. 
 117. See id. at 872. 
 118. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 697-701.  Blocking patents arise 
because of point in time at which enablement is judged.  Enablement is judged 
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new use is found for a pre-existing, patented compound.  
Minoxidil, for instance, was a patented compound, with its 
known usefulness being as a drug for relieving hypertension.119  
When it was discovered that it was also useful for treating 
baldness, those who discovered the new use obtained a patent 
for a method of treating baldness with Minoxidil.120  However, 
practicing that invention would infringe the earlier composition 
of matter patent claim to the compound Minoxidil.121  The later 
patent is a subservient patent.  The subservient patent cannot 
be practiced without a license from the holder of the dominant 
patent.  Likewise, the holder of the dominant patent cannot 
infringe the subservient patent without a license.  Thus, each 
patent effectively blocks the other.  The holder of the patent on 
 
as of the time of filing.  See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 
F.2d 1247, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  An inventor can claim material that later 
turns out to be beyond her research, as long as the disclosure enables others to 
make use the claimed invention as it was understood at the time of filing.  See 
id. at 1251.  An example is a claim of Phillips Petroleum Co. to crystalline 
polypropylene.  See id.  Phillips, at the time of the patent application, had only 
synthesized low molecular weight crystalline polypropylenes.  See id. at 1249-
50.  However, the essence of Phillips’ invention was crystyllinity, and at the 
time of filing they enabled making the only known crystalline polypropylenes.  
See id. at 1249.  That Phillips did not enable the production of higher 
molecular weight polypropylene was irrelevant to the validity of the claim, 
because “[a] patent applicant is not . . . required, however, to predict every 
possible variation, improvement, or commercial embodiment of his invention.”  
Id. at 1250 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 673 F.Supp. 
1278, 1292 (D. Del. 1987)).  The court further stated that: 
Defendants’ misdirected approach here is the same as that improperly 
relied upon by the PTO in Hogan.  Defendants do not, as they cannot, 
argue that the 1953 specification fails to enable one skilled in the art to 
practice the claimed invention.  That the [Phillips] claim may cover a 
later version of the claimed composition (crystalline polypropylene with 
higher intrinsic viscosity and average molecular weight) relates to 
infringement, not patentability.  To hold differently would “impose an 
impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent system.” 
Id. at 1251-52 (citations omitted). 
 Because enablement is evaluated at the time of filing, a later 
improvement invention can be non-obvious over the previous patent, and thus 
patentable, yet infringe the previous patent. 
 119. See generally U.S. Pat. No. 4,871,839, W.T. Gibson, Skin Treatment 
Composition. 
 120. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,139,619, C.A. Chidsey III, 6-Amino-4-(substituted 
amino)-1,2-dihydro-1-hydroxy-2-iminopyrimidine, Topical Compositions and 
Process for Hair Growth. 
 121. A patent claim to a composition of matter conveys the exclusive right 
to make, use, or sell the composition for any purpose.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  
It is irrelevant that the purpose in this case is one that was unknown at the 
time the composition of matter was claimed. 
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a method of treating baldness cannot practice his invention at 
all without a license from the holder of the patent claiming 
Minoxidil as a composition.  Likewise, the holder of the 
composition patent cannot use it to treat baldness without a 
license from the holder of the patent claiming a method to treat 
baldness.122 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
With respect to recombinant DNA patents, the Federal 
Circuit has generally focused on rules that, taken literally, 
would make generic claims to more than one specific DNA 
impossible.  First, it has created a written description rule that 
DNA must be described by its nucleotide sequence.123  Second, 
in what is really the rationale of the previous rule, it has ruled 
that DNA, and any claimed composition of matter, can only be 
described by its structure, not its function.124  It has held that 
genes and DNA cannot be conceived by their functional utility, 
i.e., what proteins they encode,125 nor by the method for 
isolating them,126 but only by their structure (nucleotide 
sequence). 
Amgen shows how these rules for recombinant DNA 
patents thwart genus claims in that field.  In Amgen, the 
inventors, after having cloned and sequenced the gene for 
erythropoietin, attempted to claim DNA sequences encoding 
 
 122. See Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 694 (1886).  When one patent is 
an improvement on another “neither of the two patentees can lawfully use the 
invention of the other without the other’s consent.”  Id.  See also MERGES, 
supra note 19, at 697-701. 
 123. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A] cDNA 
. . . requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of 
the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA.”); Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170-
71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An adequate description of a DNA requires more than a 
mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential 
method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself.”). 
 124. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568 (“A definition by function, as we 
have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is 
only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is.”). 
 125. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169 (“[C]onception of a DNA, like conception of 
any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by 
its functional utility.”). 
 126. See id. (“[C]onception only of a process for making a substance . . . can 
at most constitute a conception of a substance claimed as a process.  
Conception of a substance claimed per se without reference to a process 
requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or 
physical properties.”). 
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proteins homologous to and having the same function as 
erythropoietin.127  It was the prototypical recombinant DNA 
generic claim, claiming not just one nucleotide sequence, but 
also the other nucleotide sequences that would encode the same 
protein or closely related proteins that function in the same 
way.  These variant nucleotide sequences encoding the same 
protein would be obvious not just to one of skill in the art, but 
arguably to anyone familiar with the degeneracy of the genetic 
code.128  The inventors in Amgen tried to claim not just the 
composition of matter they had actually discovered or invented, 
but also other compositions that are closely related to the 
discovered species, that are obvious from knowledge of the 
species, and that are expected to function the same as the 
species.129  However, under the rules the Federal Circuit has 
created for recombinant DNA inventions, it is impossible to 
claim related species of DNA until their sequences have been 
determined.130  The sequences could not be claimed by their 
 
 127. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmuceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203-
04 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 128. See generally BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE 
CELL, 199-232 (1983) (outlining DNA structure, synthesis, and replication).  
The structure of any DNA molecule can be specified by the sequence of the 
four nucleotides within it.  A typical recombinant DNA molecule is composed 
of a few thousand nucleotides.  Each set of three nucleotides in the coding 
region of a gene is known as a codon and specifies one amino acid in a protein, 
as indicated below. 
 DNA: GCC-TAC-CCT-ACT 
amino acids for which it codes:Ala-Tyr-Pro-Thr 
 Proteins are polymers of 20 different types of amino acids.  Thus, when 
one knows the nucleotide sequence of a cDNA, one knows the amino acid 
sequence of the protein it encodes.  But the converse is not true.  Most amino 
acids are specified by more than one codon.  For instance, GCT, GCC, GCG, 
and GCA all code for the amino acid alanine, designated above by its three 
letter abreviation Ala. The fact that more than one codon encodes the same 
amino acid is called the degeneracy of the genetic code.  Because of the 
degeneracy of the genetic code, it would be obvious to one skilled in the art 
that one could circumvent a claim to a single nucleotide sequence by altering 
the nucleotide sequence in such a way that the DNA would still encode the 
same amino acid sequence.  A variant nucleotide sequence encoding the same 
amino acid sequence would be expected to function the same in the invention.  
Likewise, even if the claims were limited to DNAs encoding a single amino 
acid sequence, it would be obvious to one skilled in the art how to circumvent 
the claims.  One could alter the nucleotide sequence so that one or a few amino 
acids in the encoded protein were changed, because a small number of amino 
acid changes are usually tolerated biologically.  Usually the resultant protein’s 
utility would be unchanged.  See also supra note 38 and accompanying text 
(providing a more general description of DNA structure and sequencing). 
 129. See CREIGHTON, supra note 99. 
 130. See supra notes 44, 49, 54-56 and accompanying text. 
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function.131  The court also emphasized the large number of 
possible nucleotide sequences encoding a protein with an amino 
acid sequence closely homologous to EPO.132  The court implied 
that Amgen also would not have been allowed to claim the 
genus structurally — for instance, the class of nucleotide 
sequences encoding an amino acid sequence 95% or more 
identical to the amino acid sequence of EPO — because there 
are too many members of that class.133  It seems, under the 
rules of the Federal Circuit, there is no way to claim a genus of 
DNA. 
The requirements created for recombinant DNA patents 
have the effect of being an a priori ban on generic claims. There 
is no reason generic claims to this area of technology should be 
a priori precluded, especially when generic claims have been 
permitted in related areas, such as chemistry134 and monoclonal 
antibodies.135  To avoid this illogical result, the court should 
return to a focus on enablement in determining whether 
generic claims are justified, as it does in other chemical cases 
and as it has done in the recent recombinant DNA case Enzo 
Biochem, Inc.136  If the specification enables the invention to be 
practiced as broadly as it is claimed, those claims should be 
allowed.  They should not be thwarted by erecting a 
requirement that description of a claimed DNA requires 
specification of its nucleotide sequence, or that a composition of 
matter can never be claimed by its function (encoding a 
particular protein, in the case of a gene) or the process for its 
isolation. 
Why has the Federal Circuit erected special barriers to 
genus or broad claims in recombinant DNA?  The court has 
never articulated a reason for what seems to be special 
treatment given this field, but some speculation is possible.  
The court is probably concerned that it would stifle innovation 
in a new field if it allowed broad patents to block off 
 
 131. See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1212-14 (encoding a protein that behaves 
like EPO is an insufficient patent specification). 
 132. See id. (describing that after five years of testing, the inventor still 
could not identify precisely which of more than fifty analogs had the biological 
properties of EPO). 
 133. See id. at 1213-14. (The court notes that over a million analogs with 
changes in only 3 amino acids could be made, and “Amgen has told how to 
make and use only a few of them.”). 
 134. See supra notes 2, 4 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text. 
 136. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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competition.  Broad patents deter further innovation within 
their scope.137  First, others have less incentive to develop 
improvements knowing their improvements will be subject to a 
blocking patent.138  Second, the rights holder has less incentive 
to develop improvements, knowing that it will retain a blocking 
patent even if another develops them first.139 
However, while broad patent rights should hinder future 
innovation within the scope of that patent, a refusal to grant 
justified patent rights should also deter innovation.  Others will 
not develop technologies at all if they cannot get a return on 
their investment, and sometimes the only way to get a return is 
to be awarded patent rights commensurate with what they 
have developed.  If courts simply refuse to enforce broad patent 
rights, the incentives have been diminished for developing the 
significant, pioneer inventions that merit broad patent 
protection. 
Second, concern that a broad patent will block the 
incentive to develop improvements is partially addressed by the 
option of improvement patents or subservient patents.140  If 
improvements are obvious, there is no need for concern, 
because the rightsholder would see them and would have the 
incentive to develop them.  If an improvement is not obvious, 
then it is not true that the rightsholder holds complete rights to 
it.  The inventor of a nonobvious improvement covered by a 
broader patent is entitled to a subservient or improvement 
patent.141  If the invention falls within the claims of the 
dominant patent, she cannot practice it without a license from 
the dominant patent rightsholder.142  But neither can the 
dominant patent rightsholder practice the improvement 
without a license from the improvement patent holder.143  
Ordinarily, one would expect the two parties to reach an 
economically beneficial agreement, so that the improvement 
patent holder will receive some return for her contribution.144 
Third, even if it is accepted that it would be economically 
wise to disallow broad patent claims in general because of their 
 
 137. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 140. See generally supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
 141. See generally supra notes 118-22. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 945-47. 
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effect of stifling further innovation in the field, that policy 
should apply uniformly to all fields of technology, not just to 
recombinant DNA claims.  There is no apparent reason why 
broad patent rights are more economically deleterious in 
recombinant DNA than in chemistry or other fields.  With the 
written description requirement of a specific nucleotide 
sequence, it appears that unique barriers have been set up 
against generic claims to DNAs.  Returning the focus to 
enablement would put DNA claims on the same footing as other 
claims. 
Despite the possible effect of deterring innovation within 
the scope of a genus patent once the patent has been granted, 
genus patents in biotechnology should be granted and 
evaluated under the same standards as genus patents in other 
fields.  This means they should be evaluated on the basis of 
enablement.  The issues in an enablement inquiry are whether 
the scope of enablement matches the scope of the claims, and 
whether the invention can be practiced as broadly as it is 
claimed without undue experimentation.145  The additional 
requirements the Federal Circuit has erected that seem 
designed specifically to deter broad claims to DNAs — that a 
composition of matter cannot be claimed by its function or 
method of isolation, and that the nucleotide sequence of any 
claimed DNA must be specified — should be dropped. 
Some of the reasons for focusing exclusively on enablement 
in determining the breadth of claims allowed in recombinant 
DNA inventions are that it: (1) would create consistency with 
precedent on simultaneous conception and reduction to 
practice; (2) would create consistency with precedent in 
chemistry and monoclonal antibody claims; (3) would fulfill the 
purposes of the written description requirement and the 
general rule that compositions of matter should be described by 
structure; (4) is essential to avoiding easy circumvention of 
recombinant DNA patents; (5) allows for sensible assigning of 
inventorship; (6) would promote early disclosure; (6) would 
avoid economic waste; and (7) would be a rule that would not be 
made obsolete by advances in technology, as the current rules 
have been. 
 
 
 
 
 145. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text. 
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A. CREATING CONSISTENCY WITH PRECEDENT ON 
 SIMULTANEOUS CONCEPTION AND REDUCTION TO 
 PRACTICE 
 
The written description requirement that DNAs can only 
be described by their complete nucleotide sequence creates a 
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice 
for DNA inventions.146  This leads to inconsistencies with the 
prior jurisprudence on simultaneous conception and reduction 
to practice.  Reduction to practice occurs when an inventor has 
produced the actual working invention.  It occurs when “the 
embodiment . . . actually work[s] for its intended purpose.”147  
Conception occurs when the inventor has completed “the 
mental part of the inventive art.”148  In the past, courts have 
held that “conception is complete when one of ordinary skill in 
the art could reduce the invention to practice without undue 
experimentation.”149  This is the exact language of the 
enablement test.150 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”), the 
predecessor to the Federal Circuit, explained the requirement 
for invoking simultaneous conception and reduction to practice 
in stronger terms in 1974.  It stated that the doctrine applied 
“only in cases where conception is followed by extensive 
research characterized by perplexing and intricate difficulties 
arising every step of the way.”151  The doctrine was applied only 
once between 1974 and 1988.152 
Now, however, the written description requirement for a 
nucleotide sequence in DNA inventions has created a situation 
where the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to 
practice applies automatically to all claims for recombinant 
DNAs.  In fact, under this requirement conception is held not to 
occur until after reduction to practice.  Suppose one claims a 
cDNA clone that produces insulin.  That invention is reduced to 
 
 146. See John M. Lucas, The Doctrine of Simultaneous Conception and 
Reduction to Practice in Biotechnology: A Double Standard for the Double 
Helix, 26 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 381, 402-03 (1998). 
 147. Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 148. Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (citing 
Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897)). 
 149. Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 276. 
 150. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text. 
 151. Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
 152. See Lucas, supra note 146, at 397 n.113 (citation omitted). 
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practice when it is cloned and the inventor has determined that 
the bacterium containing the cloned DNA is producing insulin.  
Yet at that point, the inventor may not know the nucleotide 
sequence of the clone.  He has already reduced the invention to 
practice but still, under the written description rule, cannot 
patent it and therefore has not conceived it.  Consistency with 
the precedent of conception and reduction to practice requires 
that conception be held to occur when an inventor can enable 
one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention, or to 
isolate and create the claimed recombinant DNA.  In many 
cases, that occurs long before the DNA sequence is determined. 
 
B. CONSISTENCY WITH MONOCLONAL ANTIBODY AND CHEMICAL 
CASES 
 
DNA molecules and antibodies have very close parallels 
that should lead to similar treatment under patent law, but the 
Federal Circuit has treated them differently. The function of a 
gene is to encode a protein — to direct production of that 
protein and specify the amino acid sequence of the protein.  
Because of the redundancy of the genetic code, many possible 
nucleotide sequences can encode the same amino acid 
sequence.153  Thus, many genes could encode the same protein.  
But from a functional standpoint, the only thing we are 
interested in is what protein a gene encodes.  Nevertheless, the 
Federal Circuit in Eli Lilly and Fiers has held that for the 
purpose of obtaining patent protection for a gene, the claims 
cannot recite the gene’s function — which protein it encodes — 
and that conception of the gene is not complete with 
development of a method for isolating the gene.154  Conception 
and description of the gene is satisfied only by the gene’s 
nucleotide sequence.155 
The rule is the opposite for monoclonal antibodies.156  The 
 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 128.  The amino acid sequence of a 
protein gives one considerable information about the nucleotide sequence of 
the cDNA encoding it, but it does not completely determine that nucleotide 
sequence. 
 154. See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Antibodies are a class of proteins that help defend the body against 
invaders.  Antibodies bind tightly to other molecules, present on the invaders, 
called antigens.  See Alberts, supra note 128, at 34.  The tightness of the 
antibody-antigen binding is called affinity.  See id. at 970.  Each antibody 
binds to just one antigen, and in fact to just one part of the antigen molecule, 
148 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:121 
 
function of antibodies is to bind to particular substances called 
antigens.157  The only reason we are interested in genes is 
because of what they do: encode proteins; and the only reason 
we are interested in antibodies is because of what they do: bind 
antigens.  If two genes encode the same protein (the same 
amino acid sequence) and direct production of the same amount 
of that protein, then they are identical for virtually any 
purpose.158  Likewise, if two monoclonal antibodies bind the 
same determinant on the same antigen and bind it equally 
tightly, then they are identical for virtually any purpose.  As 
with genes, many monoclonal antibodies could perform the 
same function — binding the same determinant with the same 
affinity.  This is so because these functionally identical 
monoclonal antibodies (as with functionally identical genes, 
encoding the same amino acid sequence) could have different 
structures — different amino acid sequences.159 
Despite these virtually exact parallels between monoclonal 
antibodies and genes, the Federal Circuit has allowed 
monoclonal antibodies to be described by their function and 
conceived by their method of isolation, without any structural 
description.160 
Dropping the rules that description of a DNA invention 
requires specification of its nucleotide sequence, and that 
compositions of matter can never be claimed by their function 
or method of isolation, and returning the focus to enablement 
would restore consistency of the DNA cases with monoclonal 
antibody cases.  As discussed above, the relevant 
characteristics of monoclonal antibodies and DNA sequences 
 
called a determinant.  See id. at 972.  In an immune response, many different 
antibodies — that is, proteins with different amino acid sequences — binding 
to the same antigen are produced.  See id. at 183.  Different antibodies binding 
to the same determinant on the antigen are even produced.  See id.  From this 
diversity of antibodies binding to a single antigen, scientists can select one of 
these antibodies and make large amounts of it.  See id.  These identical 
antibodies are called monoclonal antibodies because they come from a single 
clone of cells.  See id.  A good explanation of monoclonal antibodies is found in 
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733-34 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 157. See supra note 101. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See BROCK & MADIGAN, supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
 160. See generally Wands, 858 F.2d at 731 (reversing the rejection of an 
inventor’s claims for lack of enablement where the monoclonal antibodies 
needed to make and use the invention (immunoassays) could be made from 
readily available materials using methods well known in the monoclonal 
antibody art – the mere availability of such monoclonal antibodies satisfied 
the enablement requirement). 
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are exactly parallel.  The only reason we are interested in 
either is because of their function — binding antigens 
(monoclonal antibodies) or encoding proteins (DNAs) — not 
their inherent structure.  For either, a tiny change in structure 
could drastically change its function.  A single amino acid 
change in an antibody could entirely eliminate its binding to 
the same antigen;161 a single nucleotide change in a gene could 
entirely eliminate its ability to encode any protein.162  
Conversely, for either, numerous structures could perform the 
same function.  Many different antibodies could bind the same 
antigen or even the same determinant with equal affinity; 
many different nucleotide sequences could encode the same 
protein.163 Yet the Federal Circuit has allowed antibodies to be 
described and claimed by their function but not DNAs.164  This 
inconsistency should be eliminated.  Courts addressing 
recombinant DNA inventions should ask whether the 
specification enables the claims as broadly as they are drawn, 
not whether the sequence is specified. 
Consistency with precedent in chemical patents also 
demands that genus claims to recombinant DNAs be 
obtainable.  As the Federal Circuit emphasized in Amgen,165 
there are a large number of possible nucleotide sequences 
encoding the same or very similar proteins.  The court implied 
that this alone justified denying claim to all the sequences 
 
 161. See ALBERTS, supra note 128, at 976 (describing that only 5-10 amino 
acid residues on each polypeptide chain of an antibody make contact with the 
antigen).  If one of those key residues is changed, antigen-antibody binding 
could be eliminated.  Certain single amino acid changes in other parts of the 
polypeptide could totally change the conformation of the antibody polypeptide 
at the binding site, so that the antibody no longer recognizes antigen. 
 162. The easiest way for this to happen is that a single nucleotide change 
could change a codon encoding an amino acid to a stop codon, signaling that 
synthesis of the polypeptide is to stop.  See supra note 92.  TGA, TAA, and 
TAG are stop codons, signaling termination of polypeptide synthesis. 
 163. See supra note 92. 
 164. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 731; Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1559; Fiers, 
984 at 1164. 
 165. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991).  “The district court found that over 3,600 different EPO 
[erythropoietin] analogs can be made by substituting at only a single amino 
acid position, and over a million different analogs can be made by substituting 
three amino acids.  The patent indicates that it embraces means for 
preparation of ‘numerous’ polypeptide analogs of EPO.  Thus, the number of 
claimed DNA sequences that can produce an EPO-like product is potentially 
enormous.”  Id. at 1213. 
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encoding erythropoietin.166  But the large number of possible 
nucleotide sequences encoding the same protein is not 
particularly relevant to whether or not a genus claim is 
justified.  There are a large number of variants on a specific 
chemical compound, but courts allow generic claims to a family 
of compounds when the related compounds have the same 
properties as the original species and are obvious variants of 
it.167  Often, claims encompassing a nearly infinite number of 
compounds are allowed.  The Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure states that the Examiner must come forward with 
an affirmative reason to reject a claim on grounds of a lack of 
utility.168  In the case of recombinant DNAs, there is little 
reason to doubt that sequences encoding the same or very 
similar amino acid sequences would have similar utility.  There 
appears no reason to have, in effect, an a priori ban on genus 
claims to recombinant DNAs when such claims are allowed for 
other chemicals. 
 
C. FULFILLING THE PURPOSES OF THE GENERAL RULE THAT 
 COMPOSITIONS OF MATTER SHOULD BE DESCRIBED BY 
 STRUCTURE 
 
Valid reasons exist for the general requirement that, for 
claims to chemical compounds, the compounds must recite their 
structures.  Those reasons do not apply, however, to genes and 
proteins.  The purposes of the requirement can be better 
satisfied by claiming genes and proteins by function. 
The first purpose of requiring a description of the common 
structural features of a class in genus claims to chemical 
 
 166. See id. at 1213-14.  The court stated:  
Details for preparing only a few EPO analog genes are disclosed. . . . 
This ‘disclosure’ might well justify a generic claim encompassing these 
and similar analogs, but it represents inadequate support for Amgen’s 
desire to claim all EPO gene analogs.  There may be many other genetic 
sequences that code for EPO-type products.  Amgen has told how to 
make and use only a few of them. 
Id. at 1213-14. 
 167. See generally In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  A prior generic 
patent had claimed developer compositions comprised of the esterification 
product of any chemicals from two generic families — dicarbaxylic acids and 
phenols.  The issue was whether Baird’s patent for a product involving a 
particular species of phenol was obvious in view of that generic patent. 
 168. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a)(1) (7th 
ed. 1998).  See also id. § 2164.04 (describing the burden placed on the 
examiner to establish a reason to question enablement). 
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compounds is that it clearly defines the boundaries of the 
claims.169  If one claims all linear saturated alkanes, for 
instance, one of ordinary skill in the chemical arts knows 
whether or not a compound falls within that class.170  For 
DNAs, however, that purpose can be met without a precise 
nucleotide sequence.  Mammallian insulin cDNAs, for instance, 
can be defined as cDNAs derived from a mammal that encode 
insulin, with insulin being defined as a hormone that acts to 
decrease glucose levels in the blood.171  That description by 
function clearly defines for one skilled in the art what cDNAs 
fall within the class.172  Alternatively, the class could be defined 
by a structural description, but one that falls short of an exact 
nucleotide sequence for every member of the class.  For 
instance, it could be defined as cDNAs that encode a protein 
that has an amino acid sequence at least 80% identical to the 
amino acid sequence of rat insulin.  That definition would 
probably include every natural insulin cDNA, and no other 
naturally occurring genes.  Thus, the purpose of clearly 
defining the boundaries of the claims to recombinant DNA is 
achievable without requiring an exact nucleotide specification 
of every member of the class, or even any nucleotide sequence 
information. 
A second purpose of requiring a structural description for a 
claim to an ordinary chemical or chemicals is that structure 
gives a chemist skilled in the art good information about how to 
synthesize the chemical.  For DNA, however, while a complete 
 
 169. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568 (“In claims involving chemical 
materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity what the generic 
claims encompass.  One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from 
others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass.”). 
 170. A linear saturated alkane is a compound containing only carbon and 
hydrogen, no branches on the chain, and no double or triple bonds.  It has the 
structure CH4, CH3-CH3, or CH3-(CH2)N-CH3, where N is any number from one 
to infinity.  See MOELLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 896-99. 
 171. See DARNELL ET AL., supra note 38, at 693-95. 
 172. The court in Eli Lilly & Co. held that with a functional description of 
genes (what proteins they encode), “one skilled in the art therefore cannot, as 
one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of 
the members of the genus.”  Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568.  This is 
incorrect.  If one wishes to determine the function of a protein a gene 
produces, one can isolate the protein and test it in biochemical assays to see, 
for instance, if it acts like insulin.  In the alternative, merely from the amino 
acid sequence of a protein, which is known from the DNA sequence of the 
gene, one could predict with a high degree of certainty that it performs the 
same function as another protein if the two proteins have very closely related 
sequences.  See CREIGHTON supra note 99. 
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structure would allow one to synthesize the DNA by the 
polymerase chain reaction, the same purpose could be served 
by, for instance, description of a process for isolating a cDNA 
from a library based on knowledge of the amino acid sequence 
of the protein it encodes.  In that case, specification of the 
nucleotide sequence is not necessary to enable preparation of 
the DNA.  Thus, the purpose can be served in other ways. 
A third purpose in requiring a structural description of 
chemicals is that their structure is assumed to be closely 
related to their characteristics and functional properties.  That 
assumption is wrong when applied to DNA.  The function of 
DNA is to encode proteins and a single nucleotide change could 
abolish production of the protein.173  Conversely, many 
nucleotides could be changed in a DNA while allowing it to still 
encode exactly the same protein.174  Thus, this purpose is better 
served by a functional, as opposed to a structural description. 
 
D. FULFILLING THE PURPOSES OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT 
 
The purposes of the written description requirement can be 
fulfilled without a requirement that a claim to recombinant 
DNAs must be supported by listing a particular nucleotide 
sequence. The purposes courts have asserted for the written 
description requirement are: to prove that the inventor was in 
possession of the invention on the filing date; to ensure that 
new claims are adequately supported by an earlier filed 
specification; and to guard against deception or “pretending 
that an invention is more than what it really is.”175  The written 
 
 173. Codons are sequences of three nucleotides in the coding sequence of a 
gene that encode an amino acid or other information for the synthesis of  a 
protein.  See supra note 128.  Most codons encode amino acids.  But three 
codons — TAA, TAG, and TGA — are stop codons.  They direct that no amino 
acid is to be inserted and synthesis of the protein is to stop at this point.  See 
WOOD, supra note 38, at 433-37. Thus, if CAA, for instance, encoding 
glutamine, is found near the beginning of a gene, a single base change in that 
trinucleotide codon, to TAA, would change the codon to a stop codon.  The 
result, although every other nucleotide in the gene remained the same, would 
be that synthesis of the entire protein would be stopped at that point.  Only a 
greatly shortened, nonfunctional, version of the protein would be produced, 
which would be quickly degraded in the cell. 
 174. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 128. 
 175. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); see also supra notes 31-36 and 
accompanying text. 
2001] ENABLING GENUS PATENT CLAIMS TO DNA 153 
 
description requirement makes sense when an inventor 
attempts to relate back claims to an earlier application, 
because it may be that the earlier specification had enabled the 
practice of the newly claimed invention, but at that time, the 
inventor did not realize it.  In that case, there may be policy 
reasons for asserting that the technology has been surrendered 
to the public, so that the inventor cannot reclaim exclusive 
possession of it.  Or there may be reasons for awarding priority 
to an intervening claimant who first realized the presence of an 
invention intrinsically present in the first specification, rather 
than to the initial inventor.  When we are looking at the 
specification and claims in the same patent application, 
however, it is difficult to see why the written description 
requirement is needed in addition to the enablement 
requirement.  If the person is claiming the invention, and if his 
specification enables its practice, then there is no question that 
he is in possession of it.  The enablement requirement is 
sufficient to guard against deception and fraudulent claims of 
inventorship, because enabling others to practice an invention 
necessarily implies that the inventor also has the ability to 
practice it.  In addition, if the claim at issue is present in the 
originally filed application, then there is no doubt the inventor 
recognized the claimed invention by the time of filing. 
 
E. AVOIDING EASY CIRCUMVENTION OF PATENTS 
 
Another consequence of the requirement that claimed DNA 
be specified by nucleotide sequences is that it leads to easy 
circumvention of patents.  Taken literally, this requirement 
means potential infringers could get around the claim by 
changing one nucleotide in the DNA.  It is possible to change a 
large number of nucleotides in a DNA and have no effect on the 
amino acid sequence of the protein it encodes.  Thus, infringers 
could change numerous nucleotides and still know that the 
invention will function exactly as it functioned previously.  In 
Amgen, the claim drafters tried to encompass this obvious type 
of circumvention within their claim, but the court invalidated 
it.  Amgen tried to claim other nucleotide sequences encoding 
the same, or closely related, amino acid sequences.  Amgen 
claimed all DNA sequences “encoding a polypeptide having an 
amino acid sequence sufficiently duplicative of . . . 
erythropoietin to allow possession of the biological property of 
causing bone marrow cells to increase production of . . . red 
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blood cells . . . .”176  The court invalidated this claim for lack of 
an enabling disclosure.177  It would be obvious to one of ordinary 
skill to mutate the claimed DNA in Amgen so as to make a 
single amino acid change in the encoded EPO protein.  One 
would expect that the resultant protein would probably 
function just as well as EPO, yet it would fall outside the literal 
claims.  It would be even more obvious to change the nucleotide 
sequence in a way that does not change the amino acid 
sequence of the encoded protein.  Then it is certain that the 
protein will function the same: it will be the same protein.  The 
inventors tried to draft their claims to encompass these obvious 
ways to circumvent the claims, but the court rejected their 
attempts.  That is a bad result.178  Although the court made this 
ruling based on a mistaken enablement analysis, the same 
result would flow automatically from a rule that claimed DNAs 
must be specified by their nucleotide sequences. 
 
F. PROMOTING EARLY DISCLOSURE 
 
One of the main rationales of the patent system is 
promoting disclosure of technical advances.179  Evaluating 
 
 176. See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1204 (describing the Amgen ‘008 patent, 
claim 7). 
 177. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.  At least the court was 
looking at enablement rather than a blanket rule that the nucleotide sequence 
of all claimed DNAs must be specified, but its ruling of lack of enablement 
seems debatable.  Methods of making mutations in DNAs (changing their 
nucleotide sequences) are well known in the art.  See J. SAMBROOK ET AL., 
MOLECULAR CLONING: A  LABORATORY MANUAL, Chapter 15 (2nd ed. 1989).  
Likewise, it is well known in the art that a single amino acid change in a 
protein will usually have little or no effect on the protein’s function.  See 
CREIGHTON supra note 99. 
 178. See Ex parte Dubbs, 119 U.S.P.Q. 440, 441 (Bd. App. 1958) (holding 
that an applicant is entitled to claim variables of the invention in terms 
sufficiently broad to afford protection of the invention against easy 
circumvention). 
 179. See Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s 
Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and 
History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 20, 46 (Michael B. Wallerstein et al., eds., 1993) 
(describing that in the patent system of medieval Venice, it was not even 
essential that the applicant be the inventor).  The important thing was that 
the inventor disclosed a technology not present in Venice.  See id.  Patents 
were a government grant of a temporary monopoly in exchange for importing 
and disclosing a foreign technology.  See id.  The enablement requirement of 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, is really a requirement of full disclosure, requiring that 
the invention be set out in “such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
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patents through a fact-based enablement inquiry would 
promote this goal.  Rules stating that compositions of matter 
may never be claimed by their function or method of isolation 
thwart this goal.  Once an inventor has determined the 
function of a gene by isolating, characterizing, and determining 
the amino acid sequence of a protein (which must be encoded by 
some gene) the isolation of the corresponding gene is often 
routine and obvious.180  The quickest advancement of the 
nation’s technical capacity occurs if inventors reveal their 
discoveries at that time so that others can build upon it.  But 
under the Federal Circuit’s doctrine they may not file for a 
patent on the gene at that time, because they do not know the 
nucleotide sequence of the gene.  They would be well advised to 
withhold that information until they can complete the time 
consuming yet routine steps of isolating the gene and 
sequencing it.  In Eli Lilly, for example, the inventors who 
isolated the rat insulin cDNA should have withheld that 
information from the public and used it secretly to complete the 
relatively routine steps of cloning the human insulin cDNA, 
which was the more economically valuable cDNA. 
 
G. AVOIDING ECONOMIC WASTE 
 
The current Federal Circuit requirements for patent claims 
to recombinant DNA promote economic waste.  If a group of 
inventors publicly reveal discoveries which make it obvious 
how to isolate a cDNA, as the inventors in Eli Lilly did, under 
current doctrine others may race them to perform the isolation 
and file a patent application if they do so first.181  It is 
economically wasteful to have multiple firms racing to 
accomplish a routine step that is achievable in roughly the 
same time by any one firm that attempted it.  In contrast, if the 
court eliminated the rules that DNAs may not be claimed by 
their function or method of isolation, and just focused on 
whether the specification enables one skilled in the art to 
practice the invention without undue experimentation, the 
 
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same. . . .” 35 
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2001).  The requirement that the inventor not have disclosed 
his invention more than one year prior to filing also shows that the reason 
patents are granted in the U.S. is to promote disclosure.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 
(b) (2001).  If the inventor has already disclosed (more than one year earlier), 
he is not granted a patent.  See id. 
 180. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. 
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inventor who made the subsequent steps obvious could file for a 
patent and avoid this waste. 
 
H. WRITING LAWS THAT WILL NOT BE MADE OBSOLETE BY 
 ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY 
 
Courts and legislatures should strive to write laws that 
endure and are adaptable to changing times.  Advancements in 
technology should not render patent law doctrines obsolete.  
Perhaps when the Federal Circuit first announced in Bell182 
that a prior art protein amino acid sequence did not make the 
cDNA encoding it obvious, the court was correct in the sense 
that at the time the experimentation was done in that case, it 
was not routine enough to clone a cDNA from the knowledge of 
the protein sequence.  Today, that procedure is clearly 
routine.183  The Federal Circuit’s invariant legal rule that DNA 
 
 182. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 183. The procedure has been widely used with few changes for the last 15 
years.  Amino acids are encoded by codons, a sequence of three nucleotides.  
There is more than one codon for most amino acids, but in most cases only the 
third nucleotide varies among them.  Alanine, for instance, is encoded by four 
codons, but all of them begin with GC.  The third nucleotide in the sequence 
could be any one of the four nucleotides — A, C, G, or T.  A polypeptide having 
the sequence Ala-Lys-His-Ala, would be encoded by a DNA with the sequence 
GC(A,C,G,T)-AA(A,G)-CA(C,A)-GC(A,C,G,T), where the nucleotides in 
parentheses indicate the possible third nucleotides of each codon.  See W.B. 
WOOD ET AL., BIOCHEMISTRY: A PROBLEMS APPROACH 433-37 (2nd ed. 1981).  
To find the DNA encoding the protein containing that stretch of four amino 
acids, one would synthesize a DNA having the sequence indicated above.  For 
each position where the nucleotide is uncertain one would synthesize a 
mixture of DNA containing all possible nucleotides in that position.  Thus one 
would synthesize a family of short pieces of DNA, and one member of the 
family would correspond to the exact DNA sequence of the gene encoding this 
protein.  The mixture of short DNA is labeled with radioactivity or a 
fluorescent label and then allowed to hybridize to the DNA contained in a 
library of clones.  The clone containing the DNA of interest is then identified 
by the radioactive or fluorescent label attached to it.  In practice, the short 
DNAs used must contain at least 18 nucleotides, corresponding to a sequence 
encoding at least six amino acids.  If more amino acids are known, the DNA 
can be made longer, producing more desirable results.  See T. MANIATIS, ET 
AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL 224-28 (1982). 
 This procedure is described in a “recipe book” of standard molecular 
biology procedures.  See T. MANIATIS ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A 
LABORATORY MANUAL (2nd ed. 1989).  It was also described in that manual’s 
first edition in 1982 and it has been used in identical form since at least that 
time.  The author has used the procedure to clone one gene and map two 
others; thousands of genes have been cloned in the same manner. 
The procedure is time consuming.  It takes at least two or three weeks and 
often a few months to clone a gene.  There are many steps involved, and 
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can never be claimed without specification of their nucleotide 
sequence or that compositions of matter can never be claimed 
by their function or method of isolation has been overtaken by 
technology.  It results in a bar to claiming DNA inventions 
until obvious steps are taken.184  Legal rules should be crafted 
to be adaptable to advances in technology.  The enablement 
requirement, that the patent specification must enable one 
skilled in the art to construct or perform the invention without 
undue experimentation, is flexible and adaptable to changes in 
technology.  It is flexible because enablement is judged by the 
standard of technology at the time of filing.  It has been a 
patent requirement since the first United State Patent Act of 
1790.185  It has been adaptable and useful in evaluating 
patentability through more than 200 years of technological 
advancement and it should be the central focus in evaluating 
the validity of generic biotechnology patent claims.  The 
Federal Circuit’s new rules are inflexible and have already 
been overtaken by technology.  For these reasons, the Federal 
Circuit should rescind them. 
 
 
 
difficulties can arise at each step, particularly for the novice.  But the 
procedures involved at each step have been worked out and have been used for 
years, and in the end success is virtually assured. 
 Is an undue amount of experimentation required to clone a gene from 
knowledge of the corresponding protein sequence?  Not by the standard 
followed in Wands.  See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.  The 
procedure is lengthy and time consuming, but so was the procedure for 
isolating the monoclonal antibody at issue in Wands.  See id.  Success with the 
procedure is virtually assured, as it was in In re Wands.  See id.  Difficulties 
do arise in the procedure, but they did also arose in Wands.  See id.  In fact, 
the Wands inventors failed in their first three attempts at isolating the 
monoclonal antibody, until they gained the requisite experience of one of 
ordinary skill in the art.  See id.  In biotechnology cases, a court has defined 
one of ordinary skill in the art as a junior faculty member (presumably 
possessing a doctorate degree in biochemistry or a related discipline) with one 
or two years of relevant experience, or a postdoctoral student with several 
years of experience.  See Enzo Biochem., Inc., 188 F.3d at 1373.  With that 
level of skill, it is expected that one can carry out a lengthy but routine 
procedure, and overcome the sorts of difficulties that are routinely overcome 
by others of skill in the art.  Thus, cloning a gene from the amino acid 
sequence of the protein it encodes is obvious and does not require undue 
experimentation. 
 184. See supra notes 48-56, 91-100, 182-83 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Donald S. Chisum, Comment: Anticipation, Enablement and 
Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid, 15 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N. Q. J. 
57, 59 (1987). 
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I. USING BLOCKING PATENTS TO REWARD THE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 OF ALL PARTIES 
 
Granting a genus patent to an inventor who enables the 
cloning and sequencing of a genus of genes does not necessarily 
mean the contributions of others who later clone and sequence 
particular species cannot also be rewarded with patents.  
Blocking patents accommodate this.186  Cloning a gene and 
determining its nucleotide sequence requires a significant 
amount of work — even if the protein encoded by the gene and 
the amino acid sequence of the protein are known, or if a 
homologous gene in a different species has been cloned and 
sequenced.187  Since cloning and sequencing genes does take a 
significant amount of work, it behooves society to encourage it 
by awarding patents.  Furthermore, it is true that, as the 
Federal Circuit has observed, the exact nucleotide sequence of 
a gene is not obvious merely from the amino acid sequence of 
the protein it encodes.188  For those reasons, the individual or 
group who clones and sequences a gene may deserve a patent 
on that nucleotide sequence and its close homologs.  That does 
not mean, however, that the party who isolated the protein and 
determined its amino acid sequence, or who cloned the same 
gene in a different species, does not also deserve patent rights 
over the genes whose isolation they enabled.  Both 
contributions can be recognized by the patent system.  Blocking 
patents allow this arrangement.189  One who clones the rat 
insulin cDNA, for example, should be able to claim all 
mammalian insulin cDNAs, since she has enabled their 
isolation by methods that are obvious and routine to one of skill 
in the art.  The party that then clones and sequences the 
human insulin cDNA perhaps should also have a patent on 
recombinant DNAs comprising that particular nucleotide 
sequence and its close homologs, since the particular nucleotide 
sequence was nonobvious. 
 
 186. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1562-63 (stating that while the patent 
application claiming the rat prosinsulin cDNA was filed in May of 1977, the 
application on the human proinsulin cDNA was not filed until September of 
1979). 
 188. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
 189. See In re Kaplan, 787 F.2d 1574, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that 
an improvement is patentable if it meets the same three requirements for 
patentability all inventions must meet — novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, even if it falls within the scope of a previous patent). 
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Both parties should be able to claim a range of nucleotide 
sequence variations, since those variations would be obvious to 
one of skill in the art and would not be expected to alter the 
utility of the invention.  However, if another party finds that 
one of the obvious variations on the nucleotide sequence has 
useful and unexpected properties, he can also get a patent on 
that sequence.190  Blocking patents are common in the patent 
system allowing all interests to be accommodated, and are 
appropriate under these circumstances. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Federal Circuit is apparently hesitant to uphold broad 
patent rights in the new field of recombinant DNA.  It is 
probably concerned that it should not choke off development in 
a new field of technology by granting excessively broad patent 
rights.  It does not want to reduce incentives for others to 
continue to advance the field.  That undoubtedly is a valid 
concern.  But the court has addressed the concern in the wrong 
way.  It has erected special barriers that make genus claims 
not merely difficult, but virtually impossible.  A better way to 
address the concern would be to stringently examine 
recombinant DNA patents with the enablement requirement.  
That approach could still be used to strike down patents that 
are broader than justified, but would not have the effect of 
banning all genus claims in the field and would involve the use 
of a requirement that is adaptable and need not be changed as 
technology evolves. 
 
 
 
 
 190. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.02 (a)  (7th ed. 
1998) (establishing that an unexpected property is evidence which may rebut a 
prima facie case of obviousness). 

